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This paper was presented on April 2, 2009, at Smith in Glasgow ’09, a conference held at 
the University of Glasgow, 31 March – 2 April 2009, to commemorate the 250th 
anniversary of the publication of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Adam Smith’s Historical Jurisprudence 
and the “Method of the Civilians” 
Ernest Metzger* 
Abstract.  Smith lectured in jurisprudence at the University of Glasgow from 1751 to 
1764, and various records of these lectures survive.  Since Smith never completed a 
treatise on law, these records are the principal source for his theory of lawmaking.  In his 
final year at Glasgow, Smith undertook to reorganize the course of lectures: he began 
with a series of lectures on “forms of government,” where formerly these lectures had 
fallen at the very end.  He explained that his reorganized lectures followed the method of 
the civilians (i.e., contemporary writers on Roman law), and that this method was to be 
preferred. 
 This paper discusses Smith’s theory of lawmaking and seeks to explain why he 
undertook to reorganize his lectures.  Some scholars have argued that Smith had a 
substantive reason for his decision, i.e., that the change was demanded by his developing 
theory of law.  This paper, to the contrary, argues that his decision was far more 
innocent.  He had occasionally sought to explain how certain laws came about by 
reference to the “ages of society.”  This is the theory that societies tend to present 
themselves under the model of one of four ages, each age identifiable by a certain mode of 
subsistence.  This “stadial theory,” however, though adequate to explain the genesis of a 
handful of rights, was inadequate to explain the genesis of most laws.  For the latter, 
Smith used a more immediate cause: form of government.  Yet exposition of this thesis 
was difficult when the lectures on government were postponed to the end.  Smith’s 
decision to reorganize the course of lectures helped to cure the problem. 
 The method of the civilians, whom Smith claims to be following, is the method of 
contemporary institutional literature.  Civilian works that were written to follow the 




Adam Smith is not well known as a writer on law.  Whether his projected work on 
the “general principles of law and government”1 would have given him that reputation we 
                                                                                                                                            
* Douglas Professor of Civil Law, University of Glasgow. 
1 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS VII.iv.37 (D. D. Raphael & A. L. McFie, eds., 
ed.1984) (original publication date) (hereafter TMS).  “I shall in another discourse endeavour to 
give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions 
they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society, not only in what concerns justice, 
but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law.”  Id. at 3.  
The advertisement accompanying the sixth edition reads as follows:  “In the Enquiry concerning the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, I have partly executed this promise; at least so far as 
concerns police, revenue, and arms.  What remains, the theory of jurisprudence, which I have long 
projected, I have hitherto been hindered from executing . . . .”  THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM 
SMITH no. 116 (Ernest Campbell Mossner & Ian Simpson Ross, eds., 1977; repr. 1987)  (to Lord 
Hailes; 5 March 1769): “I have read law entirely with a view to form some general notion of the 
great outlines of the plan according to which justice has [been] administered in different ages and 
nations . . . .”  The character and viability of this projected work is discussed in CHARLES L. 
2 
can only guess.  Those who study his surviving works will know, even so, that he devoted 
a great deal of attention to law.2  This is a legacy, unfortunately, that his ambitions as a 
philosopher and scholar tended to obscure.  Historically Smith was flanked by natural-
law and positivist systematizers, and systems tend to leave conspicuous monuments 
behind.  Smith, instead, treated law as part of a larger enterprise: the study of mankind 
and the communities that mankind creates.  Other subjects treated by Smith as part of 
this larger enterprise—political economy and moral decision-making—famously received 
his most careful attention and elucidation.  Law, sadly, did not.  Thus we miss his 
projected work on law very keenly. 
 Smith lectured in jurisprudence at the University of Glasgow from 1751 to 1764, 
and various records of these lectures survive.3  The lectures reflect the university 
curriculum at Glasgow and are no substitute for the lost projected work.  Yet they do 
reveal one of Smith’s key ambitions: a desire to explain what prompted a given law to be 
recognized, i.e., to explain “the causes of laws.”  It was Smith’s desire to apply his theory 
of moral decision-making to law, and to add into the causal mix some proportion of 
history, government, mode of subsistence—indeed anything that might help to explain 
the existence of any law he brought within his sights.  As such, the records of these 
lectures help us to understand at least some portion of Smith’s thinking on law, 
otherwise denied to us. 
                                                                                                                                            
GRISWOLD, ADAM SMITH AND THE VIRTUES OF ENLIGHTENMENT 256-58 (1999); DONALD WINCH, ADAM 
SMITH’S POLITICS: AN ESSAY IN HISTORIOGRAPHIC REVISION 9-27 (1978); Donald Winch, Adam Smith’s 
“enduring particular result”: A Political and Cosmopolitan Perspective, in WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE 
SHAPING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 253-69 (Istvan Hont & Michael 
Ignatieff, eds., 1983). 
2 For discussion of Adam Smith and law within a brief compass, see David Lieberman, Adam Smith 
on Justice, Rights, and Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ADAM SMITH 214-45 (Knud 
Haakonssen, ed., 2006); Neil MacCormick, Adam Smith on Law, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 243 (1981), 
reprinted in ADAM SMITH 189 (Knud Haakonssen, ed., 1998).  Arguably Smith’s most profound 
contribution to law is his exposition of the concept of justice.  For discussions of Smith’s moral 
theory generally and justice specifically, see JAMES R. OTTESON, ADAM SMITH’S MARKETPLACE OF LIFE 
13-100 (2002); Griswold, supra note 1, at 231-44; D. D. Raphael, Adam Smith, in CONCEPTS OF 
JUSTICE 113-25 (D. D. Raphael, ed., 2001).  See also KNUD HAAKONSSEN, THE SCIENCE OF THE 
LEGISLATOR: THE NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE OF DAVID HUME AND ADAM SMITH 93-98 (1989) 
(contrasting the laws of justice and the laws of police).  See also the remarks of John Millar, related 
at second hand in Dugald Stewart, Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, LL.D., in 
Adam Smith, ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 263, 274-75 (photo. reprint 1982) (W. P. D. 
Wightman, J. C. Bryce & I. S. Ross, eds., 1980) (describing the relations among the different 
components of Smith’s jurisprudence lectures and their connections to The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments).  Smith’s moral theory, founded on the ability of human beings to assess the propriety 
of human conduct and assign merit to it, is an important component of all of Smith’s writings on 
law.  It affects considerably the question whether, to Smith, the legislature or the courts is the 
better law-making organ.  See John W. Cairns, Adam Smith and the Role of the Courts in Securing 
Justice and Liberty, in ADAM SMITH AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 31 (Robin Paul 
Malloy & Jerry Avensky, eds., 1995); John W. Cairns, Ethics and the Science of Legislation: 
Legislators, Philosophers, and Courts in Eighteenth-Century Scotland, 8 JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHT UND 
ETHIK 159 (2000); and briefly in John W. Cairns, Attitudes to Codification and the Scottish Science 
of Legislation, 1600-1830, 22 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 45-47 (2007).  It is also the engine for 
historical development in law.  See HAAKONSSEN, supra note 2, at 99-177; PETER STEIN, LEGAL 
EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 29-46 (1980). 
3 The critical edition, containing the two principal sets of notes, is ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON 
JURISPRUDENCE (R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein, eds., (1982) (1978).  By common 
convention the earlier of the notes is cited LJA and the latter LJB, and they are cited in this way 
below.  Citations to the extensive introduction to the critical edition are given below as LJ 
INTRODUCTION.  In addition to these two sets of notes, some brief extracts of a student’s notes to an 
earlier course of these lectures, perhaps from the mid 1750s, is given in R. L. Meek, New Light on 
Adam Smith’s Glasgow Lectures on Jurisprudence, 8 HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 466-77 (1976), 
reprinted in R. L. MEEK, SMITH, MARX AND AFTER 81-91 (1977) (hereafter ANDERSON NOTES). 
3 
 In his final year at Glasgow, Smith undertook to reorganize his jurisprudence 
lectures.  He had formerly begun the lectures on justice4 by speaking on the central 
institutions of private law (property and obligations), then on domestic law (matters that 
civilians would treat under the law of persons), and last on forms of government.  In his 
final year of lectures, however, he began with forms of government, then passing to 
domestic law and private law.  Lacking as we do a full account of Smith’s views on law, 
we naturally ask whether the changes are significant in any way.  Smith himself 
explained briefly his decision to reorder the lectures.  His explanation falls near the 
beginning of the revised course of lectures. 
The origin of natural rights is quite evident. . . .  But acquired rights such as 
property require more explanation.  Property and civil government very much 
depend on one another.  The preservation of property and the inequality of 
possession first formed it, and the state of property must always vary with the 
form of government.  The civilians begin with considering government and then 
treat of property and other rights.  Others who have written on this subject begin 
with the latter and then consider family and civil government.  There are several 
advantages peculiar to each of these methods, tho’ that of the civil law seems on 
the whole preferable.5 
Smith does not give a great deal away.  He does not explain what civilian model he is 
following, nor what advantage he finds in the so-called method of the civil law.  Most 
importantly, he leaves open the question whether his thoughts on law and the “causes of 
laws” had changed before he gave his final course of lectures. 
 This article discusses Smith’s decision to reorganize his lectures, and makes a 
modest argument, which for convenience may be summarized as follows.  Smith wanted 
to describe how certain laws came about—what caused them to be.  He occasionally 
explained how certain laws came about by reference to the “ages of society.”6  His notion 
was that societies tend to present themselves under the model of one of four ages, each 
age identifiable by a certain mode of subsistence.  This “stadial theory” alone, however, 
was inadequate to explain the genesis of most laws, and to explain a given law Smith 
often turned to a more immediate cause: form of government.  Certain forms of 
government tended to produce certain laws.  Properly speaking, these latter arguments 
were not independent of the stadial theory, but were related to it in ways that Smith had 
not yet fully worked out.  Scientific rigor, however, was a less urgent problem than 
exposition: in postponing his introduction to forms of government, Smith was 
handicapped in presenting his arguments.  He cured the problem by reorganizing the 
lectures and discussing form of government at the beginning.  In doing so he selected a 
civilian model founded on the institutional literature of his time. 
                                                                                                                                            
4 “Justice” forms the first part of the lectures on jurisprudence, and is followed by “police, revenue 
and arms.”  See infra note 9.  See LJA i.1-2; HAAKONSSEN, supra note 2, 95-96.  On the foundations 
of the division, and its shortcomings, see Lieberman, supra note 2, at 234-39.  
5 LJB 11. 
6 Judging by the earlier, verbatim record of the lectures, Smith favored the word “age” over “stage” 
in this context.  He introduces the subject with the word “state” and follows with the appositional 
“or age” (LJA i.27).  He then uses “age” repeatedly in the principal discussion: LJA i.27-65.  “Age(s) 
of society” appears at LJA i.27, 32, 33, 64; vi.100.  See also iv.28 (“ages before government is 
established”).  “Stages of society” appears at LJA ii.152; iii.116.  See also LJA ii.53 (“stages of 
commerce”); ii.75 (“stages of civill government”). 
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The Glasgow lectures on jurisprudence 
Smith’s lectures on jurisprudence at Glasgow are well known and it is necessary 
here only to relate a few important points.7  The full course of lectures comprised natural 
theology, ethics,8 and jurisprudence.9  Ethics and jurisprudence (“moral philosophy”) at 
Glasgow was founded on Pufendorf’s De officio hominis et civis10 at the instigation of 
Gershom Carmichael (1672-1729), one of Smith’s Glasgow predecessors, in the 1690s.11  
Carmichael and his successors, up to and including Smith, had presented moral 
philosophy in the same broad order of subjects as Pufendorf, though Carmichael had 
famously inverted Pufendorf’s scheme of duties into a scheme of rights.12  Smith inherited 
this scheme of rights, and at the outset he preserved the order of subjects he inherited.  
The specific scheme Smith inherited was that of Francis Hutcheson, Smith’s predecessor 
but one in the Glasgow chair, and the author of the textbook on which the moral 
philosophy portion of the course was then based: Philosophiae Moralis Institutio 
Compendiaria (1742).13 
                                                                                                                                            
7 For an exhaustive discussion of the lectures and the character and provenance of the notes, see LJ 
INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 2-42.  On the ways in which the lectures reflect Smith’s ideas on the 
origins of moral decision-making, see Lieberman, supra note 2, at 216-21; Stein, supra note 2, 29-
46; Peter Stein, Adam Smith’s Jurisprudence — Between Morality and Economics, in JUBILEE 
LECTURES CELEBRATING THE FOUNDATION OF THE FACULTY OF LAW UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM 137 
(1981); MacCormick, supra note 2, at 246-57; Knud Haakonssen, What Might Properly Be Called 
Natural Jurisprudence?, in THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 205-25 (R. 
H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, eds., 1982), reprinted in ADAM SMITH 167-87 (Knud Haakonssen, 
ed., 1998).  For a broad introduction to the lectures, with special attention to the evolution from 
natural to historical jurisprudence, and the contribution of Roman law, see GLORIA VIVENZA, ADAM 
SMITH AND THE CLASSICS: THE CLASSICAL HERITAGE IN ADAM SMITH’S THOUGHT 84-125 (2001).  On the 
history of teaching moral philosophy at Glasgow, and Smith’s entrance on the scene, see IAN 
SIMPSON ROSS, THE LIFE OF ADAM SMITH 111-27 (1995).  On the influence of the lectures on the 
entrance qualifications of aspiring advocates in Scotland, see John Cairns, Adam Smith’s Lectures 
on Jurisprudence: Their Influence on Legal Education, in ADAM SMITH: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 63-83 (Hiroshi Mizuta & Chuhei Sugiyama, eds., 1993).   
8 Smith’s ethics lectures were strongly informed by his own moral philosophy (see Stewart, supra 
note 2, at 274) — an important point, as Smith was to rely on his moral philosophy in the 
jurisprudence lectures that follow. 
9 Jurisprudence itself was divided into two: justice, and police, revenue, and arms.  This was a 
division observed by Smith’s predecessors, combined by Smith under a single head.  See LJ 
INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 4-5.  To Smith, all of these subjects are the “design of every 
government” (LJA i.1) or the “objects of law” (LJB 5), but the two components appear to be 
distinguished by nothing more nuanced than urgency.  See LJA i.1-2; HAAKONSSEN, supra note 2, 
95-96.  On the foundations of the division, and its shortcomings, see Lieberman, supra note 2, at 
234-39.   
10 The new critical edition in English: SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN ACCORDING TO 
THE LAW OF NATURE (Ian Hunter & David Saunders, eds., 2003). 
11 See James Moore & Michael Silverthorne, Gershom Carmichael and the Natural Jurisprudence 
Tradition in Eighteenth-Century Scotland, in WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 73-87 (Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff, eds., 1983).  
Translated excerpts of Carmichael’s works are given in JAMES MOORE & MICHAEL SILVERTHORNE, 
NATURAL RIGHTS ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: THE WRITINGS OF GERSHOM 
CARMICHAEL (2002). 
12 James Moore & Michael Silverthorne, Natural Sociability and Natural Rights in the Moral 
Philosophy of Gerschom Carmichael, in PHILOSOPHERS OF THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 6-8 (V. 
Hope, ed., 1984). 
13 See ROSS, supra note 7, at 112.  The modern critical edition is FRANCIS HUTCHESON, 
PHILOSOPHIAE MORALIS INSTITUTIO COMPENDIARIA, WITH A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY (Luigi Turco, ed., 2007). 
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 The two principal sets of lecture notes relate to the lectures on jurisprudence 
given by Smith in 1762-1763 and (probably) 1763-1764.14  As Smith left Glasgow in 
January of 1764,15 it seems likely that at least some portion of the latter course of 
lectures was given by another with the aid of Smith’s own materials.16  The notes differ 
from one another in character; the earlier set is virtually a verbatim record by, 
apparently, at least two different students, while the latter is a summary, somewhat 
redacted after being prepared.  The notes also differ in the extent of their coverage.  The 
latter set gives a full account of the second component of jurisprudence (police, revenue, 
and arms), while the earlier set closes well before the second component is complete.  The 
first component (justice) is treated to an equal extent in both sets of notes, with due 
allowance for the more abbreviated presentation of the latter set, and allowance also for 
Smith’s decision to follow the method of the civil law in the latter lectures, the subject of 
this article. 
The rights framework; natural and adventitious rights 
In the scheme Smith inherited from Hutcheson,17 justice was treated as an 
analysis of the rights that belonged to man.  Rights were assembled in a careful 
taxonomy based on the context in which the right arose.18  For example, rights that 
related to citizenship or servile status were of a different quality from rights that related 
to marriage, and both of these were of a different quality from ownership rights.  Smith 
and his predecessors, taking account of these different contexts, observed a broad three-
fold division.19   A man may have a right — 
1.  as a man; 
2. as a member of a family; 
3. as a citizen or a member of a state. 
The first of these subdivided further, so that a man — 
1. as a man, 
a. may have a right in his person; 
b. may have a right in his reputation; 
c. may have a right in his estate. 
Each of these various divisions gave the writers the opportunity to discuss kindred rights 
collectively.  A good deal of public law, for example, fell within the ambit of a right “as a 
                                                                                                                                            
14 The earlier set of lecture notes contains a sufficient number of date references to make the 
chronology clear, but the latter set of notes indicates only its date of preparation (1766), and hence 
the date of these lectures is an inference, though a fairly secure one. 
15 Smith’s travels with the Duke of Buccleugh from January are related in ROSS, supra note 7, at 
195-219. 
16 LJ INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
17 The evolution of the scheme up to Smith is outlined within a brief compass in PETER STEIN, From 
Pufendorf to Adam Smith: The Natural Law Tradition in Scotland, in EUROPÄISCHES 
RECHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT COING 667-79 (N. Horn, 
et al., eds., 1982), reprinted in THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL 
ESSAYS 381-93 (1988). 
18 The word “context” is too vanilla to describe the basis of the rights-framework before Smith; the 
framework was founded ultimately on the nature of the different duties owed by man.  To Smith, 
however, it is fair to say that the framework was largely serviceable as a way to discuss laws and 
institutions by subject-matter, except where it fortuitously reflected his distinction between natural 
and adventitious rights, discussed below. 
19 See LJA i.9-12; LJB 6-7.  For what is given below, see the extensive discussion in HAAKONSSEN, 
supra note 2, at 99-134. 
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citizen or a member of a state”; various liberty rights fell within the ambit of the right of 
a man “in his person”; and much of private law—property, contract, and delict—fell 
within the ambit of the right of a man “in his estate.”  Context, however, was not the only 
organizing principle for rights.  A right was also distinguished by origin, though here 
Smith’s treatment of origins must be sharply distinguished from that of his predecessors. 
 In the traditional scheme, some rights belonged to a man under natural law, 
while others were “man-made,” the so-called acquired, or adventitious, rights.20  This 
mode of classification does not “cut across” the taxonomy just given, but informs it.  In 
other words, certain categories in the scheme contained natural rights, others, 
adventitious rights: 
1.  As a man 
a. in his person (natural) 
b. in his reputation (natural) 
c. in his estate (adventitious) 
2. As a member of a family (adventitious) 
3. As a citizen or a member of a state (adventitious) 
Thus liberty rights, for example, as they belong to a man “in his person,” are natural in 
origin, while property rights, as they belong to a man “in his estate,” are adventitious in 
origin. 
 When Smith took up the lectures, he embarked on an enterprise quite different 
from that of his predecessors, and it is remarkable he was able to use their model, 
preserving even a shadowy outline of natural and adventitious rights. 
Smith recognized that a scientific understanding of man’s relations with his 
fellows could only be developed by the experimental method used by Newton in 
the physical sciences.  Such an understanding must be based on observation of 
how men actually behave in different situations.  He also accepted that, although 
the conditions of society vary considerably in different places and different ages, 
human nature remains constant . . . .21 
                                                                                                                                            
20 “Private rights of individuals according to their different originals are either natural or 
adventitious.  The natural are such as each one has from the constitution of nature itself without 
the intervention of any human contrivance, institution, compact, or deed.  The adventitious arise 
from some human institution, compact, or action.”  FRANCIS HUTCHESON, 1 A SYSTEM OF MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 293 (1755) (emphasis in original).  “Nature herself has endowed each man with natural 
rights; adventitious rights arise from some human action or other event.”  Gershom Carmichael, 
Supplements and Observations upon Samuel Pufendorf’s On the Duty of Man and Citizen according 
to the Law of Nature, in MOORE & SILVERTHORNE, supra note 11, at 77.  “Some of these [duties] 
proceed from that common Obligation which it hath pleas’d the Creator to lay upon all Men in 
general; others take their Original from some certain Human Institutions, or some peculiar, 
adventitious or accidental State of Men.”  SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN, 
ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE (Andrew Tooke, trans., 2003) (emphasis in original). 
21 Stein, Adam Smith’s Jurisprudence, supra note 7, at 139-40.  Stein’s reference to Newton is 
perhaps intended to recall the famous remark of John Millar: “The great Montesquieu pointed out 
the road.  He was the Lord Bacon in this branch of philosophy [the history of civil society].  Dr. 
Smith is the Newton.”  2 JOHN MILLAR, AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 404 n.(*) 
(Mark Salber Phillips & Dale R. Smith, eds., 2006).  Smith himself praises Newton’s principles 
effusively in ADAM SMITH, The History of Astronomy, in ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 31, 98-
105 (W. P. D. Wightman & J. C. Bryce, eds., 1980; repr. 1982) and ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON 
RHETORIC AND BELLES LETTRES 145-46 (J. C Bryce, ed., 1983; repr. 1985).  On Smith’s adherence to 
a Newtonian system, see the authorities cited infra, note 23. 
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Smith, unlike his Glasgow predecessors, was an enthusiastic gatherer of data,22 
specifically data about laws as they were observed in human communities over a vast 
span of time.  In a scientific spirit, he set out to explain the genesis of these laws 
causally.23  The task was possible only because he saw laws as ultimately the product of 
the moral decision-making of human beings.  The constancy and predictability of human 
moral decision-making in the face of different underlying conditions made causal 
explanations possible.  These laws, moreover, could be organized in the traditional 
framework without doing violence to the causal explanations; pedagogy, after all, would 
have made it sensible, in any event, to discuss slavery, ownership, promises, etc., 
separately. 
 What about natural and adventitious rights?  This would seem to be a distinction 
of no earthly use to Smith, who had embarked on what we would call a “sociological” 
project and ostensibly could not accept the existence of a natural right founded on the 
“constitution of nature.”24  Yet this is where Smith could summon his theory of morals to 
explain natural and adventitious rights in a way that both united and distinguished 
them.  Humans self-evidently make different moral judgments in different times and 
places, but the mechanism by which they make those judgments is the same.25  The 
foundation of this mechanism is the psychological fact that humans spontaneously 
experience a fellow-feeling or “sympathy” with other people.  When they see a person, for 
good or ill, acting upon another, they spontaneously imagine themselves doing the same, 
and spontaneously weigh the propriety of the act.  At the same time they imagine 
themselves to be the object of the act and, again spontaneously, weigh their feelings.  
This produces a judgment on whether the act should be answered by punishment or 
reward.  The judgment, however, is not the product of accident, caprice, or reason.  It is 
instead the slow consequence of the accumulated experiences of one’s having lived in a 
human community and having oneself been the object of others’ sympathetic 
observations.26  This, at its briefest, is how Smith understood the mechanism of moral 
decision-making, and it is this process of decision-making that ultimately causes human 
communities to recognize rights of every kind—natural and adventitious. 
                                                                                                                                            
22 It is worth stressing that Smith, though a gatherer of data, was not the first at Glasgow to reject 
rationalist natural law.  Hutcheson, like Smith, examined how the thoughts and behaviour of 
human beings could form a foundation for moral judgment.  See John Cairns, Legal Theory, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 231 (Alexander Broadie, ed., 2003), and 
the literature cited id. at 240-41 n.44.  
23 On the question whether Smith envisioned a single causal model for both the natural and social 
sciences, see Christopher J. Berry, Smith and Science, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ADAM 
SMITH 112, 126-34 (Knud Haakonssen, ed., 2006) (with literature).  Berry has described Smith’s 
position as one of “soft determinism”: moral causes operate predictably but nevertheless 
accommodate changes in circumstance.  Id. at 130-34.  On Smith’s scientific aspirations generally, 
and contrasts with David Hume, see ATHOL FITZGIBBONS, ADAM SMITH’S SYSTEM OF LIBERTY, 
WEALTH, AND VIRTUE 75-94 (1995) (with literature). 
24 See supra note 20. 
25 Among the many excellent summaries of Smith’s moral theory are these: ADAM SMITH, THE 
THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS vii-xxi (Knud Haakonssen, ed., 2002); OTTESON, supra note 2, at 13-
100; ROSS, supra note 7, at 157-76; T. D. CAMPBELL, ADAM SMITH’S SCIENCE OF MORALS (1971).  
26 See TMS III.i.3 (describing the impossibility of formulating, in solitude, notions of propriety or 
demerit).  The passage is discussed in Berry, supra note 23, at 133-34, who stresses that morals, 
though acquired by learning and explicable by the social scientist, are nevertheless well within 
one’s power to criticize and condemn.  See also Knud Haakonssen, Natural Jurisprudence and the 
Theory of Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 205, 212 
(Alexander Broadie, ed., 2003): “[I]f the activity of a person is to be seen — by others and by the 
person herself — as belonging to that person in more than the sense of being physically caused by 
her, then the activity in question has to be seen from a standpoint that is common to both 
spectators and the person who is active.” 
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 The thesis, however, is not so simple as “moral judgments give rise to rights.”  
Some rights are in fact more determined, and their content more certain, than others.27  
This is because man’s psychology, for whatever reason, reacts with special revulsion to 
certain injuries, in particular certain injuries against the person.  In these cases the 
injury is especially vivid to the spectator; the process of moral decision-making is 
unaffected by events surrounding the injury; and the community—indeed every 
community—is unanimous in its condemnation.  Other kinds of injuries might sometimes 
excite equal or greater revulsion, and equal or greater condemnation, but they do not 
belong in the special class, because the spectator’s response, even when heightened, owes 
some portion of its intensity to the particular circumstances in which the injury was 
committed.   Thus this sort of injury is less determined and the attendant right to be free 
from that injury is contingent, while the other sort of injury is determined and the 
attendant right to be free from that injury is non-contingent.28  Smith adopted the term 
adventitious to describe the contingent rights, and natural to describe the non-contingent 
ones.29 
Historical jurisprudence 
It is not cynical to suggest that the principal reason why Smith troubled to keep 
alive the distinction between natural and adventitious rights is that it gave him the 
opportunity to isolate the class of rights that most interested him: rights that could be 
explained causally.  The overwhelming proportion of the lectures is indeed devoted to 
explaining laws that required explaining, and not to laws that could be explained with a 
footnote to The Theory of Moral Sentiments.  Among the causes he proposed to consider in 
depth, one has already been mentioned: form of government.  Another cause, also closely 
identified with his historical jurisprudence, is mode of subsistence, and this requires a 
brief introduction. 
 This branch of Smith’s historical jurisprudence is based on the idea that a society 
provides for its subsistence in a certain way, and that different modes of subsistence 
prompt the creation of certain rights, or more mildly, that they leave their mark on those 
rights.  Each mode of subsistence delineates a certain so-called “age” —four in number—
and one can locate, historically, the genesis of certain rights in certain ages.30  There is a 
chronological order to the ages, but there is no suggestion that a civilization necessarily 
progresses through every age, or that laws were utterly determined by materialist 
                                                                                                                                            
27 The explanation of natural and adventitious rights that follows owes a great deal to 
HAAKONSSEN, supra note 2, at 100-103, with the minor qualification discussed below in note 28. 
28 It is not usual to describe adventitious rights as “contingent,” but the alternatives (“historical,” 
“governmental”) slightly miss the mark.  The important point is that adventitious rights are partly 
determined by the circumstances that gave rise to them and, properly speaking, any circumstance 
at all can be a causal factor: climate, topology, rank, etc.  See HAAKONSSEN, supra note 2, at 101.  
29 See, e.g., LJA ii.93: “Crimes are of two sorts, either 1st, such as are an infringement of our 
natural rights, and affect either our person in killing, maiming, beating, or mutilating our body, or 
restraining our liberty, as by wrongous imprisonment, or by hurting our reputation and good name.  
Or 2dly, they affect our acquired [adventitious] rights, and are an attack upon our property, by 
robbery, theft, larceny, etc.” 
30 One or another age makes its appearance singly in places, but for discussions of the four ages 
together, see LJA i.26-35, iv.1-40; LJB 19-30, 149-151; ANDERSON NOTES, supra note 3, at 467-68; 
ADAM SMITH, 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS V.i.a-b.17 (R. 
H. Campbell, et al., eds., 1976) (hereafter WN).  See also Adam Smith, First Fragment on the 
Division of Labour, in ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 583-84 (R. L. Meek, et al., eds. 
1978) (brief remarks on the ages of civilization and division of labour).  Extended treatments: R. L. 
MEEK, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE IGNOBLE SAVAGE (1976); PETER STEIN, The Four Stage Theory of the 
Development of Societies, in THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL 
ESSAYS 395-409 (1988); A. S. SKINNER, Historical Theory, in A SYSTEM OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: PAPERS 
RELATING TO ADAM SMITH 76-105 (1996). 
9 
concerns.31  Nor is there any suggestion that certain ages necessarily produce certain 
laws, or that laws undergo a certain evolution.  Smith’s use of the four ages is best 
understood as a genetic theory which attempts to explain some of the origins of a 
selection of rights by reference to mode of subsistence.  Smith’s theory of morals, of 
course, undergirds the whole: what members of a community regard as an injury depends 
on how spectator-sympathy directs them, and spectator-sympathy may vary with mode of 
subsistence. 
 The four ages of civilization are: the Age of Hunters, the Age of Shepherds, the 
Age of Agriculture, and the Age of Commerce.  Below is a brief description of the first 
three of these ages.  The Age of Commerce evades any simple summary and is unrelated 
to the arguments here.32 
 The Age of Hunters.  Subsistence is by collecting wild fruit, catching wild animals, 
and fishing.33  The idea of property in any exclusive sense is almost unknown.34  One’s 
right to a piece of property is essentially coterminous with possession.35  There is no 
proper government.36  
 The Age of Shepherds.  The step between the Age of Hunters and this age is the 
“greatest in the progress of society”37
 
because the notion of property is no longer limited to 
possession: property in movables is recognized for the first time.38  This comes about 
because the inhabitants of this age need to provide carefully for their sustenance, and 
this leads them to store goods and eventually to keep and tame animals.39  Since these 
cannot always be in one’s immediate possession, the inhabitants come to regard it as an 
“injury” for a person to take something to which another has established some 
connection.40  The recognition of property in movables—and the disputes this provokes—
is accompanied by the first appearance of what may be called government.41  There is 
                                                                                                                                            
31 See SKINNER, supra note 30, at 82-83; J. SALTER, Adam Smith on Feudalism, Commerce and 
Slavery, 13 HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 219, 219-24 (1992); HAAKONSSEN, supra note 2, at 185-
89; CAIRNS, Ethics, supra note 2, at 172.  Cf. J. CROSPEY, POLITY AND ECONOMY 68-69 (2001) (“[T]he 
element of rational choice in the process of social evolution is precisely what Smith denies.”).  On 
the materialist interpretation, see especially Winch, Adam Smith’s “enduring particular result”, 
supra note 1, at 257-62 (taking Smith at his word that the four ages were introduced to explain how 
law and government, in Smith’s words, “grew up with society”).  
32 The emergence of a commercial society from the final stages of the age of agriculture, 
characterized by feudal land tenure and personal dependency, is described in WN III.  See Andrew 
S. Skinner, Adam Smith: An Economic Interpretation of History, in ESSAYS ON ADAM SMITH 154, 
162-68 (Andrew S. Skinner & Thomas Wilson, eds., 1975) (summary).  A commercial society is 
marked by a high degree of division of labor, inequality of conditions, and relative opulence.  See 
Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff, Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations: An Introductory 
Essay, in WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE SCOTTISH 
ENLIGHTENMENT 1, 2-8 (Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff, eds., 1983) (discussing the paradox 
between inequality and opulence).  The addition of an “age of commerce,” in this intellectual 
tradition, precedes Smith.  Stein argues that the addition of this age reflects the decision by certain 
Scottish writers to shift attention from property to contract.  So long as contract was rooted in 
natural law, there was no occasion to explain it historically.  STEIN, supra note 30, at 401-405.  
Stein singles out Henry Home, Lord Kames, for special mention.  Kames had argued that a society 
recognized the seriousness of contractual undertakings only when, in its history, it had passed 
beyond the use of simple cash sales and came to rely on merchants, who by the nature of their 
business rely on the power of convenants.  HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, HISTORICAL LAW-TRACTS 60 
(2nd ed. 1761) (Tract II: “History of Promises and Covenants”); STEIN, supra note 30, at 403-405. 
33 LJA i.27-28; LJB 149. 
34 LJA i.44; LJB 150; WN V.i.b.2. 
35 LJA i.41-44, iv.19, 22; LJB 149-150. 
36 LJA iv.4, 6-7, 19; LJB 19-20.  This point is discussed infra, text accompanying notes 65 to 72. 
37 LJA ii.97. 
38 LJA i.45-46, iv.43; LJB 150-151; ANDERSON NOTES, supra note 3, at 467. 
39 LJA i.28, 44-45; LJB 20, 149. 
40 LJA i.45. 
41 LJA iv.21; LJB 20. 
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little or no legislative power,42 but judicial organs make their first appearance, first via 
an assembly, then through the authority of individuals.43  
 The Age of Agriculture.  Agriculture as a mode of subsistence is introduced when 
inhabitants find it difficult to sustain themselves by animals alone, and when they 
observe that seeds produce plants similar to the plants that bore them.44  This spurs a 
realization in the value of land, and by degrees, property in land is recognized for the first 
time.45 
 The ages of society are therefore models that seek to provide modest causal 
explanations for the recognition of adventitious rights.  Natural rights continue to be 
observed in all ages, needing no such explanations.  It is important to point out that, even 
though natural rights are determined by their received share of spectator-sympathy and 
emphatically not by their historical context, nevertheless the very source of these rights 
makes it possible for them to arise and be recognized in an early historical period.  In The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith explains that “[a]mong equals each individual is 
naturally, and antecedent to the institution of civil government, regarded as having a 
right both to defend himself from injuries, and to exact a certain degree of punishment for 
those which have been done to him.”46  The point is important, because Smith sometimes 
finds it useful to “locate” a particular natural right in an early historical period.  An 
example of this is given in the discussion below.47 
The reorganization of the lectures 
It will be useful to outline Smith’s reorganization at its highest level.48  The table 
below presents the order of subjects as given in the latter course of lectures (second 
column).  It associates those subjects with the corresponding subjects in the 
Pufendorf/Carmichael/Hutcheson rights framework (first column).  One notices that the 
rights framework is now somewhat scrambled.49  The third column shows the order 
Smith followed in the earlier course of lectures.  One preliminary point worth noting: the 
discussion of the rights of a man in his person and reputation has remained in the same 
position over the two courses of lectures.   
Rights framework Lectures 1763-1764 (LJB) Lectures 1762-1763 (LJA) 
as a man, 
— in his person 
— in his reputation 
11 i.24-25 
as a citizen or a member 
of a state 
11-9950 iv.1 - v.149 
as a member of a family 101-148 iii.1-147 
as a man, 149 i.25 - ii.180 
                                                                                                                                            
42 LJA iv.14-15, 18; LJB 22-23. 
43 LJA iv.9-10, 15-16, 30-31; LJB 22, 26. 
44 LJA i.30-31; LJB 149.   
45 LJA i.50-53; LJB 151.   
46 TMS II.ii.1.7 (emphasis added).  This is the obverse of his statement in LJB 11, quoted above: 
“But acquired rights such as property require more explanation.  Property and civil government 
very much depend on one another.”  See supra the text accompanying note 5. 
47 See infra note 101. 
48 Within these divisions Smith has made other, less obvious changes in the order of subjects.  
Perhaps the most conspicuous of these is his decision to begin the treatment of rights “as a citizen 
or a member of a state” with a discussion of the principles of utility and authority, and the doctrine 
of original contract.  See LJB 12-18; LJ INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 27. 
49 For the rights framework presented in its traditional order, see supra, text accompanying note 
19. 
50 The manuscript here leaves a page blank; hence the discontinuity with the next section. 
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— in his estate 
 
 Knud Haakonssen addresses at length Smith’s decision to reorganize his lectures 
and offers conclusions on both the reasons for Smith’s decision and the origins of the new 
mode of presentation.51  Haakonssen’s conclusions turn strongly on the notion of 
authority, and its role in Smith’s natural jurisprudence.  Smith, Haakonssen notes, 
rejected the idea that man had ever existed in a “state of nature.”52  Haakonssen glosses 
this as follows:  “The individual would always be living in some kind of social grouping 
with systems of governance, even if only the most rudimentary ones, as among bands of 
hunters and gatherers.”53  Thus the stadial theory describes not only progress in different 
modes of subsistence, but progress in the development of government.54  This, according 
to Haakonssen, serves Smith’s theory of rights, because rights presuppose government.  
“[A]n explanation of government seemed a necessary presupposition for Smith’s theory of 
natural justice or natural law, meaning his theory of rights.”55  This is not, we should 
understand, something that Smith was late to appreciate; what Haakonssen appears to 
suggest is that when Smith reorganized his lectures, he was attempting to make 
manifest, in the very order of the lectures, a point about the nature and origin of rights 
that was perhaps unnecessarily obscured in the earlier lectures. 
 In what respect does Smith’s reorganization—placing government first— reflect 
the method of the “civil law”?  Haakonssen’s answer:56  
 At first it is puzzling that Smith should suggest that the “civilians” put 
political jurisprudence, or “government,” first.  Plainly, no writer on the civil law, 
by which Smith meant corpus iuris civilis, began with a discussion of the 
principles of political governance (with a partial exception, to be considered later 
on).  What Smith must have meant—and, one may hope, explained to his 
students—was that the civil law always presupposed the existence of political 
society, civitas, as a precondition for the law of the civitas. 
The “partial exception” to which Haakonssen refers is Samuel von Cocceji (1679 – 1755),57 
whom Smith praises as a writer “of note”58 near the opening of the latter course of 
lectures.  Cocceji was chancellor to Frederick the Great and famously the author of a 
successful treatise on natural law.  Originally published in 1740 under the title Elementa 
jurisprudentiae naturalis et romanae, the treatise, now under the title Novum systema 
jurisprudentiae naturalis et Romanae, was appended to an extended commentary on 
                                                                                                                                            
51 KNUD HAAKONSSEN, Adam Smith Out of Context: His Theory of Rights in Prussian Perspective, in 
NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 129-53 
(1996). 
52 LJB 3: “[I]t in reality serves no purpose to treat of the laws which would take place in a state of 
nature, or by what means succession to property was carried on, as there is no such state existing.” 
53 HAAKONSSEN, supra note 51, at 130 (emphasis added). 
54 Id. at 134. 
55 Id. at 135. 
56 Id. at 130 (emphasis in original).  
57 For what follows, see Erich Döhring, Cocceji, Samuel, in 3 NEUE DEUTSCHE BIOGRAPHIE 301-302 
(Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed., 1957) (career); 
Roderich von Stintzing, Cocceji, Samuel, in 4 ALLGEMEINE DEUTSCHE BIOGRAPHIE 373-76 
(Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed., 1876) (works). 
58 LJB 4.  The passage in full: “The next who wrote on this subject was Baron de Cocceii, a 
Prussian.  There are five volumes in folio of his works published, many of which are very ingenious 
and distinct, especially those which treat of laws.”  It is quite possible that the final remark is a 
joke, in which case he perhaps esteems Cocceji less.   
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Cocceji’s father’s work on Grotius,59 and then republished in many editions under the 
title Iustitiae Naturalis et Romanae Novum Systema.60  Smith’s debt to this work, as 
evidenced in the jurisprudence lectures, is very great.61  Though regarded as a writer on 
natural law, Haakonssen brings Cocceji into the civil law fold by noting that he presented 
his discussion of rights in the order of the Roman civil law:  persons, property, and 
personal rights (i.e., obligations).  Haakonssen thus identifies Cocceji as a possible 
inspiration for Smith’s reorganization:  “[T]he new need for a socio-psychological and 
historical account of the intertwining of rights and the rest of social living would have 
tempted him to follow Cocceji’s Romanizing and put the account of social authority 
first.”62 
  The main difficulty with Haakonssen’s argument is the significance he assigns to 
the role of government in Smith’s system of rights.  That government (or more accurately, 
form of government) shapes the nature of adventitious rights is quite true, but that 
Smith viewed the whole of the adventitious rights structure as, to some degree, the 
product of government, is far less certain.  Man always lived in some sort of social 
grouping,63 but Haakonssen has somewhat conflated social grouping with systems of 
governance64 in an attempt to bring Smith’s system of rights—indeed all of it—under the 
umbrella of government. 
 In Smith’s historical account, government and authority, though not slow to 
arrive, do not properly make their appearance until the age of shepherds.  Smith’s 
discussion of the matter is careful and nuanced.65  In the earliest age, the age of hunters, 
“there can be very little government of any sort, but what there is will be of the 
democraticall kind.”66  By “democraticall” Smith means that the community as a whole 
exacts punishment for individual transgressions, and that matters of peace and war are 
matters for the whole people to decide.67  Smith is at pains to make clear that he does not 
regard this as “government,” and that he does not see government as coming into 
existence until the subsequent age: “The age of shepherds is that where government 
                                                                                                                                            
59 SAMUEL L. B. VON COCCEJI, INTRODUCTIO AD HENRICI L. B. COCCEII . . . GROTIUM ILLUSTRATUM, 
CONTINENS DISSERTATIONES PROOEMIALES XII (1748) (Dissertatio XII).  This was the edition in 
Smith’s library: HIROSHI MIZUTA, ADAM SMITH’S LIBRARY: A CATALOGUE No. 377 (2000). 
60 Edition consulted: SAMUEL L. B. VON COCCEJI, IUSTITIAE NATURALIS ET ROMANAE NOVUM SYSTEMA 
(1762) (published in Lausanne by Marcus-Michael Bousquet).  A different publication history is 
given in HAAKONSSEN, supra note 51, at 136-37 & nn. 19, 21. 
61 The editors of the lectures have noted various passages in which Cocceji is mentioned, or his 
influence is present: LJA, at 28 n.45, 36 & n.75, 39 n.82; 324 n.82; LJB, at 398 (eliding father and 
son).  See also Ernest Metzger, Adam Smith and Roman Servitudes, 72 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 327 (2004), which is an extended study of Smith’s use of Cocceji in one area of 
private law. 
62 HAAKONSSEN, supra note 51, at 147-48.  Precisely how Cocceji served as a civilian model, and 
justified putting “the account of social authority first,” is not clear in Haakonssen’s account.  
Haakonssen appears to discover some inspiration in Cocceji’s discussion of the law of persons (see 
COCCEJI, supra note 60, at 48-127), and in particular the observation by Cocceji that certain 
matters of status are actionable quite apart from any rights granted under the main body of private 
law.  HAAKONSSEN, supra note 51, at 143-44.  It is true that among the conditions discussed by 
Cocceji in this passage is status determined de civitate (“according to statehood”: COCCEJI, supra 
note 60, at 125-27), though a modern civilian would take the discussion as simply that of 
citizenship, not very different in substance from J. INST. 1.4, which it closely tracks.  Whether 
Haakonssen’s remark, that “civil law always presupposed the existence of political society, civitas” 
(quoted in full supra, in the text accompanying note 56), was intended to evoke the words de 
civitate, is not clear from his discussion. 
63 Or to be more accurate, the man who lived utterly on his own, and who thus lacked the ability to 
develop within himself any moral apparatus, was not worth remarking on.  See supra note 26.  
64 See the quotation accompanying note 53, supra. 
65 LJA iv.3-7; LJB 19-20. 
66 LJA iv.4.  Similarly, LJA iv.6: “The whole of the government in this state, as far as there is any, 
is democraticall.” 
67 LJA iv.4-7. 
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properly first commences.”68  Similarly, in the latter course of lectures: “The 
appropriation of herds and flocks, which introduced an inequality of fortune, was that 
which first gave rise to regular government.  Till there be property there can be no 
government, the very end of which is to secure wealth, and to defend the rich from the 
poor.”69  The latter passage makes Smith’s intentions clear: the notion of property does 
not arrive until the age of shepherds,70 and it is property that prompts the creation of 
government by making government necessary.  This is not, of course, a detail in Smith’s 
jurisprudence, but one of its most essential points of departure.  We therefore cannot, 
with Haakonssen, accept that Smith regarded systems of governance as a broad 
precondition to rights.71  When, moreover, we consider Smith’s discussion of government 
in the age of hunters, it is a fair inference that in allowing for so-called “democraticall” 
governance during that age, Smith was attempting to accommodate and subdue a 
handful of details gathered from Lafitau and Charlevoix, details that might strike an 
undiscerning reader as evidence of government.72 
 David Lieberman also attempts to explain why Smith reorganized his lectures 
and, like Haakonssen, attributes the change to something profound in Smith’s natural 
jurisprudence.73  To Lieberman, however, Smith made the decision in order to remedy a 
problem that had affected his lectures to that point. 
[I]t must be acknowledged that the combining of natural jurisprudence and 
historical jurisprudence was never entirely seamless.  One important fault line 
concerned the manner in which Smith’s lectures accommodated two distinct 
organizing schemes for the analysis of a legal system.  The first, supplied by 
natural jurisprudence, distributed the legal materials into three distinct 
categories according to the legal status of an individual legal subject: rights as “a 
man,” rights as “a member of a family,” and rights as “a member of a state.”  The 
second, supplied by the taxonomy of the four-stages theory, order the legal 
materials according to the relevant “stage” of society, but in a manner that 
emphasized the interdependence of those legal rights and legal practices which 
the classification of natural jurisprudence separated.  As heuristic devices, the 
two schemes pointed in different directions.74 
Lieberman goes on to argue that, by reorganizing the lectures, Smith was able to bring 
together the two interdependent elements (property and government). 
One major result of this reordering of materials was that it enabled Smith to 
reach far more quickly, and thus give greater prominence to, one of the most 
original and powerful elements of his historical jurisprudence: his account of the 
                                                                                                                                            
68 LJA iv.7, 74. 
69 LJB 20. 
70 Specifically, property in movables.  See LJA i.45-46; LJB 150-151; ANDERSON NOTES, supra note 
3, at 467. 
71 Or to put the matter plainly: adventitious rights must have existed in the pre-governmental age 
of hunters.  To conclude differently is to accept that the only injuries recognized as such among the 
inhabitants of this age were injuries that would invite spectator sympathy and condemnation in 
any time or place.  This is tantamount to saying that this particular mode of subsistence—hunting 
and fishing—is utterly redundant in Smith’s scheme of causal explanation.  Cairns says that this 
pre-governmental age “only had natural rights.”  Cairns, supra note 7, at 70.  He is perhaps taking 
his cue from statements by Smith like the following: “Thus among hunters there is no regular 
government; they live according to the laws of nature.”  LJB 19.  Smith’s statement, of course, is 
broadly true when one compares the age of hunters with the ages that follow—which is surely his 
point. 
72 LJA iv.5-6. 
73 Lieberman, supra note 2, at 230-32. 
74 Id. at 231. 
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emergence of the modern European system of public justice and regular 
government.75 
Much in Lieberman’s account is very well observed.  Few readers should disagree with 
the suggestion that the rights framework inherited from Hutcheson did not suit Smith’s 
historical jurisprudence; or the suggestion that the last of the four ages served as the 
foundation for Smith’s most powerful ideas; or—most important—the suggestion that the 
new organization permitted Smith more effectively to ally property and government.  
Lieberman’s account falls short, however, as an explanation for Smith’s decision to 
reorganize his lectures.  Briefly: the stadial theory makes somewhat disconnected 
appearances in the lectures, and though no one would deny the significance of the latter 
of the four ages in Smith’s enterprise, it is difficult to make the case that the four ages 
collectively provided an immanent organizing principle which Smith’s reorganization 
helped to realize.  The real “tension” between Smith’s enterprise and the lectures he 
inherited lies in the significance of  “natural” and “adventitious” rights, and even this 
tension seems not to have troubled Smith a great deal; the reorganization certainly did 
not cure it.  These points are treated in detail below. 
The explanatory force of the four ages 
Smith occasionally refers to one or another of the four ages when discussing 
specific antique rules in domestic and private law,76 but his proper discussions of the four 
ages occur in two passages in each of the two sets of lecture notes.77  In the earlier 
lectures, the four ages first appear as an introduction to the acquisition of property, and 
second as an introduction to forms of government.78  In the first of these passages it 
appears to have been Smith’s ambition to subject various modes of acquisition 
(occupation, tradition, accession, usucapion, and succession) to a stadial analysis.79  Had 
he been able to achieve this, and bring what amounts to the whole of the private law of 
property into a four-ages framework, it would be easier to conclude, with Lieberman, that 
Smith was trying broadly to accommodate the law within the stadial theory.  In the 
execution, however, he subjected only one mode of acquisition (occupation) to a stadial 
analysis,80 and though his analysis can only be described as brilliant, this represents a 
significant retreat in his ambitions.  The retreat is made explicit in the latter, 
“reorganized” lectures where, in the passage corresponding to the one under discussion,81 
Smith has offered the four ages as an introduction, not to the acquisition of property 
generally, but to occupation alone.82 
Why has Smith retreated on the four ages?  In a separate study83 this author has 
suggested that, for the lectures on private law, Smith relied heavily on Roman law, but 
that the Roman sources ultimately frustrated his use of the stadial theory.  Traces of 
rights that belonged particularly to one of the earlier ages were difficult to find in the 
                                                                                                                                            
75 Id. at 232. 
76 See, e.g., LJA i.92 (succession in the ages of hunters and shepherds), i.149 (testamentary 
succession in the age of hunters). 
77 LJA i.26-35, iv.1-40; LJB 19-30, 149-151. 
78 LJA i.26-35 and iv.1-40, respectively.  The latter section is introduced with this explanation: “But 
before I enter on these [forms of government] particularly, it will be proper to explain the origins of 
government, what I take to be the originall form of it, and how the severall governments which now 
subsist have sprung from it, and how this original government arose and at what period of society.” 
LJA iv.3-4. 
79 LJA i.26-27. 
80 Described in detail in Metzger, supra note 61, at 341-42. 
81 LJB 149-150. 
82 As noted in LJ INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 30. 
83 Metzger, supra note 61, at 351-52. 
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literature of a legal system that, how ever simple its origins, was highly refined at the 
time it was written down and discussed.  The principal example given in that study was 
servitudes—rights in immovable property—whose origins Smith, by circuitous and 
unpersuasive means, was forced to locate in the age of shepherds, an age in which 
immovable property did not exist.84  This is an example of the stadial theory not simply 
“failing to explain,” but actively getting in Smith’s way. 
The stadial theory, at least to the extent Smith had developed it in the lectures, 
was perhaps less capable of explaining the “causes of laws” than he would have wished.  
One can take Smith’s treatment of intestate succession as an example.85  Smith devoted a 
great deal of lecture time to this subject: though it is only one of several modes of 
acquisition, and acquisition occupies a relatively small proportion of the notes as a whole, 
the notes on succession occupy nearly one-half of a volume (of the six total).86  The stadial 
theory makes a brief appearance:87 
In the age of hunters there could be no room for succession as there was no 
property.  Any small things as bows, quiver, etc. were buried along with the 
deceased; they were too inconsiderable to be left to an heir.—In the age of 
shepherds, when property was greatly extended, the goods the deceased had been 
possessed of were too valuable to be all buried along with him.  Some of those 
which he might be supposed to have the greatest attachment to would be buried, 
as a horse, and ox, etc.; the rest would go to the other members of the family as is 
hereafter explain’d.  Some traces of the custom of burying goods are found long 
after. 
In Smith’s extended and detailed treatment of succession, this fragment is a trifle.  In the 
manuscript, moreover, the fragment is written on the reverse of the page, probably 
indicating either that (1) the principal note-taker missed it, or (2) it was not included 
when the lecture was first given.88  Either possibility diminishes its importance. 
 The contrast between this fragment and the remainder of Smith’s discussion 
could not be greater.  Smith appeals to “form of government” again and again to explain 
details in the law of succession that the stadial theory would have no hope of explaining.  
The following is a selection. 
LJA i.98.  [Succession by representation was recognised early in Rome, but 
relatively late in Scotland:] This proceeded from the nature of the governments. 
                                                                                                                                            
84 Id. at 346-51. 
85 One can view Smith’s treatment of intestate succession as an extended refutation of the natural 
lawyers, who had founded the law of intestate succession on the supposed inclination of the 
decedent to favor those whom, in life, he held most dear.  See PUFENDORF, supra note 10, at 133-34; 
HUTCHESON, supra note 13, at 152-54.  To Smith, this was contrary to the example of history; if the 
natural lawyers were correct, then the practice of making wills would have arisen before the 
practice of intestate succession, and this was clearly not the case.  LJA i.91-92, 103-104, 149-155; 
LJB 155-156, 164; STEIN, supra note 2, at 41-42.  Thus Smith sets out on a vigorous and exacting 
discussion of the historical origins of intestate sucession. 
86 LJA i.90 - ii.1. 
87 LJA i.92 verso. 
88 For various explanations of the material on the verso pages, see LJ INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, 
at 12-13.  The fragment appears to have no counterpart in the latter set of lecture notes.  This could 
be evidence that Smith did not mention the four ages at this point in his lectures.  Cf. LJB 156: “In 
a rude period a man had scarce the full property of his goods during his lifetime, and therefore it 
cannot be supposed that then he should have had a power to dispose of them after his death.”  This 
is not the counterpart to the quoted fragment, but was included as part of a discussion of 
testamentary succession, somewhat earlier in the lecture. 
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LJA i.111.  Another considerable odds [between Scots law and the civil law on 
right of representation] arose from the difference of the constitution of the two 
states. 
LJA i.116.  As this method of succession [i.e., primogeniture], so contrary to 
nature, to reason, and to justice, was occasioned by the nature of feudall 
government, it will be proper to explain the nature and temper of this 
constitution or form of government, that the foundation of this right may be more 
evident. 
LJA i.125.  It is to be observed that this form of government required that the 
possessors of estates should attend their lords in war, or in council in peace, so it 
was requisite that every estate should be filled by one who was able to perform 
those duties. . . .  By this means the burthen of ward was introduced. 
LJA i.127.  It is to be observed that this government [i.e., feudal] was not <at> all 
cut out for maintaining civill government, or police. 
LJA i.130.  The law at that time (as we shall explain when we consider the origin 
of government) did not provide, nor indeed could it, for the safety of the subjects. 
LJA i.147.  All these varieties betwixt the Scots and English law with regard to 
succession, as well as severall differences in the order of succession betwixt them 
and the civil law, have been already considered, and the causes which brought 
them about explained from the nature of the severall constitutions. 
Each of these excerpts marks a serious excursus into the genesis of the laws being 
explored.  To take the first excerpt (LJA i.98) as an example: the right of a child to 
“represent” his deceased father in the succession to the estate of his grandfather was, as 
Smith notes, late to arrive in Scotland relative to Rome.  In the passage quoted, Smith 
attributes this to “the nature of the governments.”  In the subsequent passage89 where he 
explains the point at length, he narrows the source of the discrepancy to one feature: 
primogeniture.90 
If it was hard that the eldest son should exclude his brothers, they would think it 
hard that their nephew should exclude them after his death.  That he who should 
naturally owe his safety and depend on them for his protection should be not only 
not dependent on them but, on the other hand, that they who were men should be 
subjected and dependent on one who might often be a minor or an infant. . . .  By 
these and such like motives the younger brother would be prompted to deprive 
their elder brothers children of the right of inheritance, and by this means it was 
long after the introduction of primogeniture ere the right of representation took 
place. 
This is the age of agriculture, but there is no reason to mention the fact here: the 
hallmarks of this age, numerous as they are, are unequal to the task of explaining the 
“causes” of the law of succession in a satisfactory way.  We recognize, without perhaps 
quite knowing the reason, that without the intermediate aid of “form of government” or 
something equally powerful, Smith would have no hope of explaining such a developed 
legal institution as the right of representation. 
                                                                                                                                            
89 LJA i.135-140. 
90 LJA i.135-136. 
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John Cairns, however, points to the reason in a single sentence.  After recounting 
some of the principal features of each age, he says “[t]his [stadial] development does not 
explain how the rights recognised by the spectators became laws.”91  The stadial theory 
explains the existence of a handful of rights, for example the right to possession and the 
right to the ownership of movables.  To advance further and explain why certain rights 
were enforced (i.e., became laws) requires, not the abandonment of the stadial theory, but 
a more precise means of causal explanation, including some recourse to law-making 
institutions.  Cairns’s own concern is to examine the evolution of different organs of 
government in Smith’s account, and then consider which of these organs Smith preferred 
to see the law issue from.92  Cairns accordingly undertakes to trace the evolution of 
judicial and legislative power in Smith’s account.  Judicial power arises in the age of 
shepherds, proceeding through subtle stages, but the stadial theory is quickly lost to view 
as Smith resorts to historical examples.  Cairns:93 
Smith only loosely mapped the development of government onto his device of the 
four stages.  No doubt this was because he did not have a crudely deterministic 
theory of social change.  It means, however, that he never directly addressed the 
development of certain institutions of government in a detailed or precise way.  
This certainly applies to his account of the growth of legislative and judicial 
powers. 
This raises of course a quite profound question about Smith’s long-term ambitions: 
whether he intended in the fullness of time to discuss law-making institutions more 
analytically and less historically, or whether, as Cairns suggests, there was a 
deterministic Rubicon he had resolved not to cross.  A closer examination of Smith’s 
materialism and its role in the genesis of law-making institutions would help to answer 
this question. 
Far more clear is the fact that mode of subsistence, without the intermediary aid 
of  “form of government,” cannot properly explain the genesis of laws.  Each mode of 
subsistence produces, for its associated age, a limited number of  rights, whose most 
concrete contribution to the development of laws is to provide a series of termini post 
quem, e.g., 
1. The advent of the age of shepherds is the terminus post quem for the 
recognition of the right of accession.  (LJA i.64). 
2. The advent of the age of shepherds is the terminus post quem for the 
recognition of acquisition by prescription.  (LJA i.77). 
3. The advent of the age of agriculture is the terminus post quem for the 
recognition of rights in land. (LJA i.66). 
These are valuable insights, though without the intermediary of “forms of government,” 
tautology is an ever-present danger: 
— “Accession of crops was unknown until the age of agriculture, being the first 
age to recognize ownership in land.” 
— “What is the age of agriculture?” 
— “It is the age characterized by its recognition of ownership in land.”  
                                                                                                                                            
91 Cairns, Ethics, supra note 2, at 173 (emphasis added). 
92 Id. at 173-75.  A fuller account is given in Cairns, The Role of the Courts, supra note 2, at 42-45. 
93 Cairns, Ethics, supra note 2, at 173 (emphasis added).  See also SKINNER, supra note 30, at 84 
(emphasis in original): “[I]t is noteworthy that his treatment of public jurisprudence, with its 
attendant use of the ‘four stages,’ in fact unfolded within the framework of a historical account of 
the origins and nature of the present ‘establishments’ in Europe.”  
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It seems inconceivable that Smith did not appreciate this danger.  It is a strong 
inducement to play the stronger hand: form of government. 
As part of his lifelong enterprise, Smith may have hoped to link, more clearly, 
mode of subsistence to government, and government to law.94  Whether this ambition was 
capable of success is not part of this discussion, which is concerned solely with his 
decision to reorganize his lectures.  We take as our starting point his own explanation, 
that “the state of property must always vary with the form of government.”95  We 
recognize that the relationships he might have hoped to establish between government 
and mode of subsistence were not yet fully worked out at the time he delivered his 
lectures.  In this state of affairs, it is understandable how, for the sake of exposition, he 
would wish to elevate and promote a signally important factor in lawmaking—form of 
government—even if the full causal chain, from stadial theory to law, was still a work in 
progress. 
This discussion began with Lieberman’s suggestion that Smith wished to 
accommodate the stadial theory within the uncomfortable environs of the 
Pufendorf/Carmichael/Hutcheson framework.  The argument here, to the contrary, is that 
the stadial theory was not yet ready to assume the burden of explaining the genesis of 
laws.  The framework, moreover, though clearly at odds with Smith’s jurisprudence, had 
in fact always been at odds with Smith’s jurisprudence, without Smith himself giving any 
sign of a desire to escape it.  This is the subject of the next section.   
Framework rights versus natural jurisprudential rights 
The Pufendorf/Carmichael/Hutcheson framework was at odds with Smith’s 
jurisprudence in this respect:96 the framework “front-loaded” the natural rights, and if 
Smith had adhered to this practice, he would have found himself beginning his lectures 
on family and private law with a disconnected stream of natural rights drawn from 
different areas of the law.  This is because, as already noted, his own notion of natural 
and adventitious rights differed greatly from the notion on which the framework was 
founded.  Smith, in a word, had set himself the task of examining adventitious rights 
more closely than his predecessors.  He sought to explain causally what his predecessors 
might have dismissed with “this is the product of human action” or “a jurist invented 
this.”  He was therefore able, from time to time, to locate a natural right secreted among 
a mass of adventitious rights.  One example of this, not secreted but in full view, is in his 
treatment of delinquency (or delict).97  Severe delicts directed against the body of another 
are self-evidently a violation of natural rights.  That they happen to fall deep within a 
discussion of adventitious rights is of no moment.  Cairns: “Given the schema into which 
he fitted his analysis of rights this is correct, though at first sight odd.”98  A more subtle 
example is acquisition by occupation: though occupation falls squarely within the right of 
a man “in his estate,” and was therefore adventitious to Smith’s predecessors, 
nevertheless the specific right to hunt game that one is pursuing (a part of the law of 
occupation) is, to Smith, a natural right.99  A third example, modeled on the one previous, 
concerns the right of a person, named as heir in a will, to accept or decline the 
inheritance.100  Inheritance, like occupation, is an adventitious right, and yet to Smith 
                                                                                                                                            
94 This is the obvious inference from his lengthy introduction to government, introduced by the four 
ages: LJA iv.1-40; LJB 19-30. 
95 LJB 11. 
96 Discussed at somewhat greater length in Metzger, supra note 61, at 338-42. 
97 See LJA ii. 93 (quoted supra, note 29); Cairns, Role, supra note 2, at 41. 
98 Cairns, Role, supra note 2, at 41. 
99 LJA i.20, 37-38, ii.28-29; LJB 9-10, 150, 174. 
100 To accept an inheritance (hereditas) was a significant step, because the inheritance comprised a 
bundle of other rights (properties, and debts owed and owing), and obviously some inheritances 
were best avoided.  For background, see William M. Gordon, Succession, in A COMPANION TO 
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the right of the heir to choose to accept the inheritance was a natural right, in the same 
manner as one who hunts game has a natural right to have what he pursues.101  He gave 
the name “exclusive privilege” to this type of right, and—stirring the pot even more—
offered both natural and adventitious examples.102 
 Thus Smith’s system of  rights clashed openly and repeatedly with the identically 
named, but utterly different rights set out in the Pufendorf/Carmichael/Hutcheson 
framework.  Yet the clashes seem hardly to matter.  They certainly have no bearing on 
Smith’s decision to reorder his lectures: to say that Smith found himself increasingly at 
odds with the framework is tantamount to saying that Smith, until his final year of 
lectures, did not fully understand his own notion of rights.  The clashes, in any event, are 
equally evident in the latter course of lectures.  More generally, the fact that Smith was 
content, year upon year, to intrude natural rights into all the “wrong places” suggests he 
never had any great reverence for the framework. 
The method of the civilians 
In adopting a new order for his lectures, Smith expressed a preference for the 
method of the civilians, who “beg[an] with considering government.”103  To review: the 
new order differed from the old in two respects.104  First, the so-called public 
jurisprudence, setting out and describing the evolution of forms of government, was 
moved from the end to the beginning (after a brief introduction).  Second, the so-called 
domestic law, setting out rights relating to husband and wife, parent and child, etc., was 
placed immediately following public jurisprudence, but before the main body of private 
law (property, contract, delinquency) which, in the earlier lectures, it had followed. 
When Smith refers to the method of the civilians, we know from context that he is 
referring to the order in which civilian works present their subject matter, and not to the 
character of the underlying scholarship.  Method, in the sense Smith means it, is not 
difficult to locate.  After the rediscovery of Justinian’s Digest in the eleventh century, 
civilian scholarship was dominated by the gloss and steadfastly followed the order of the 
                                                                                                                                            
JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 80, 81-82 (Ernest Metzger, ed., 1998); J. A. C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN 
LAW 497-98 (1976). 
101 LJA i.19-20, ii.26-41; LJB 9-10, 174-175.  See especially LJA ii.27-28: 
It is plain that [inheritance] can not be considered as a different species of real right after 
the heir has entered to the inheritance, for then he has the same right that the defunct 
had and is considered as the same person, having full property in every respect.  It can be 
in no other case than during the time betwixt the death of the last proprietor and the 
entrance of the heir that the inheritance can be considered as giving a new species of a real 
right.  Now what right is it that the heir has before his entrance?  No other but that of 
excluding all others from the possession untill he determine in whether he will enter heir 
or not.  . . .  This [exclusive privilege] of inheritance is evidently founded on natural reason 
and equity. 
Why does Smith take so much trouble to isolate this natural right?  The answer perhaps is that he 
wished to locate the origins of inheritance at an early age of civilisation, perhaps the age of 
shepherds.  The age of hunters had no property, and succession would be unknown to those 
communities, but the age of shepherds did recognize property—and succession, though in a 
rudimentary form.  LJA i.92 verso.  The age of shepherds, however, lacking virtually every legal 
refinement needed to effect a succession of goods, would find this right of the heir essential.  By 
identifying the right as natural, Smith is able to locate the origins of this important device in the 
community that needs it.  On “natural rights” as “early rights,” see above, text accompanying note 
47.  
102 MacCormick commends the category of exclusive privileges as an able characterization of 
incorporeal property.  MacCormick, supra note 2, at 249. 
103 Smith is quoted in full above, in the text accompanying note 5. 
104 A table comparing the order of the two lectures is set out above. 
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Corpus iuris civilis.105  Thereafter works became more diverse: a preference for 
commentary over gloss freed the writer to some degree from the traditional order.106  
Greater freedom was won when the humanist jurists of the sixteenth century lost their 
reverence for the text of the Corpus iuris civilis and their successors sought a deeper 
principle of legal organization in Justinian’s Institutes.  This latter stage is the important 
one: it brings a centuries-long ascendancy in the scheme of the Institutes, a work that 
helped to organize and inspire many works of scholarship as well as legislation,107 
ultimately giving Smith his “method of the civilians.” 
 The Institutes, broadly speaking, presents itself as a series of events entitling a 
person to a particular form of redress.108  The humanist jurists, however, saw something 
deeper: a scheme of rights.  A particular species of “advantage” attached to one who could 
claim ownership in a thing, or one to whom something was owed, and these advantages 
(i.e., abstract subjective rights) could be discussed without reference to means of redress.  
For present purposes what is significant is the new-found freedom to discuss, criticize, 
and arrange these rights.  It was a freedom that allowed the creation of a system of rights 
inspired by the Institutes but not dependent on the text.  It also allowed a divergence of 
approaches in presenting Roman and territorial law.  Stein:109 
In the middle of the seventeenth century, a division can be discerned among 
writers offering a systematic presentation of the civil law or of national laws 
based on the civil law.  One group continued to follow essentially the institutional 
arrangement, but with certain refinements.  The other preferred to base their 
systems on the so-called geometrical method of argument from the general to the 
particular.  The problem for those who wished to proceed in this way was to 
identify the general principles of law, equivalent to the axioms of mathematics, 
from which detailed rules could be logically deduced.  Such principles were 
normally presented as arising from the nature of man in society, the implication 
being that anyone who denied their validity would be denying the rationality of 
nature itself.  Eventually these systems became ideal systems of natural law, 
although the detailed rules apparently deduced from the general principles often 
bore a strong similarity to the rules of Roman law, but stripped of what could be 
regarded as antiquarian details. 
The result was two roughly parallel bodies of romanistic literature in the latter 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: works on natural or territorial law which showed 
                                                                                                                                            
105 On the rediscovery of the Digest and civilian scholarship to the advent of humanism, see 
ANTONIO PADOA SCHIOPPA, STORIA DEL DIRITTO IN EUROPA: DAL MEDIOEVO ALL’ETÀ CONTEMPORANEA 
79-98, 149-63, 188-204 (2007); RANDALL LESAFFER, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY: A CULTURAL AND 
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 252-61 (2009); PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 43-49, 52-74 
(1999). 
106 “Whereas commentaries ultimately followed the sequence of the Corpus [iuris civilis], this no 
longer applied to treatises.  These were monographs dealing exhaustively with a well-defined 
subject in a systematic order selected by the author.”  LESAFFER, supra note 105, at 260. 
107 For a discussion of the influence of the Institutes within a brief compass, see JUSTINIAN’S 
INSTITUTES 18-26 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod, trans., 1987).  For a more extensive treatment, see 
the authorities cited infra, note 108. 
108 The treatment here is indebted to STEIN, supra note 105, at 79-82; Peter Stein, The Fate of the 
Institutional System, in HULDIGINGSBUNDEL PAUL VAN WARMELO 218 (Johann van der Westhuizen, 
et al., eds., 1984), reprinted in THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL 
ESSAYS 73 (1988); Klaus Luig, The Institutes of National Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries, [1972] JUR. REV. 193. 
109 Stein, The Fate of the Institutional System, in THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN 
CIVIL LAW, supra note 108, at 78. 
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in places a strong Roman footprint, and more traditional civilian works which expounded 
Roman law in the older humanistic tradition.110   
 Smith, in the passage explaining his reorganization, contrasts “civilians” with 
“others.”111  He had undertaken to weigh the merits of the two bodies of literature just 
discussed.  The method of organization attributed to the “others,” being Smith’s own 
method to that point, is that of Pufendorf’s De officio hominis et civis (the foundation 
work at Glasgow), and of Pufendorf’s natural law followers, such as Christian Wolff, 
whose Ius naturae methodo scientifica pertractatum (1740-1748) mirrors Pufendorf’s 
work.  The civilian model is less obvious but nevertheless plain.  That Smith should 
attribute a single method of organization to “civilians” is at first surprising, as writers on 
the civil law had, to that time, produced varieties of works almost beyond counting.  Yet 
this very inaccuracy betrays his meaning.  He can only be referring to civilian works 
founded on the Corpus iuris civilis, and of these, works founded on Justinian’s Institutes 
are the only plausible models.  This is because, in proposing to adopt a civilian method, 
he is comparing the method of “others” who observe the institutional divisions of persons, 
property, and obligations, but in a different order.     
 Smith’s library held the following civilian works.112  
1. “Heinecci Antiquitatum 2 Toms.”113  This is probably a reference to: Johann 
Gottlieb Heineccius, Antiquitatum Romanarum jurisprudentiam 
illustrantium syntagma secundum ordinem Institutionum Justiniani 
digestum.114  It is a commentary on Justinian’s Institutes, following the order 
of the Institutes. 
2. Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, Elementa Juris Civilis, secundum ordinem 
pandectarum (1740).115  It is a commentary on Justinian’s Digest, following 
the order of the Digest. 
3. “Heineccius Ad Institutionum.”116  This may be a reference to the popular 
work Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, Elementa iuris civilis secundum ordinem 
institutionum.117  It is a brief commentary on Justinian’s Institutes, following 
the order of the Institutes. 
4. “Arnoldi Vinnii in Institutionum Imperialium Commentarius.”118  This is 
probably a reference to: Arnold Vinnius, In quatuor libros institutionum 
                                                                                                                                            
110 For further discussion of the parallel traditions, see G. C. J. J. VAN DEN BERGH, THE LIFE AND 
WORK OF GERARD NOODT 124-32 (1988); Luig, supra note 108, at 197-200; Peter Stein, Legal 
Humanism and Legal Science, 54 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 297 (1986), reprinted in 
THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 91 (1988). 
111 LJB 11. 
112 These books are selected on the basis that they were written following the order of works in the 
Corpus iuris civilis.  References to books with uncertain titles are taken from entries in a catalogue 
prepared at Smith’s direction in 1781; the catalogue is reproduced in TADAO YANAIHARA, A FULL AND 
DETAILED CATALOGUE OF BOOKS WHICH BELONGED TO ADAM SMITH NOW IN THE POSSESSION OF THE 
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO (1951; repr. 1966) (appendix II). 
113 Mizuta, supra note 59, no. 764. 
114 The identification is the suggestion of Mizuta.  Edition consulted: JOHANN GOTTLIEB HEINECCIUS, 
ANTIQUITATUM ROMANARUM JURISPRUDENTIAM ILLUSTRANTIUM SYNTAGMA SECUNDUM ORDINEM 
INSTITUTIONUM JUSTINIANI DIGESTUM (C. G. Haubold & C. F. Mühlenbruch, eds., 1841). 
115 Mizuta, supra note 59, no. 765.  Edition consulted: JOHANN GOTTLIEB HEINECCIUS, ELEMENTA 
JURIS CIVILIS, SECUNDUM ORDINEM PANDECTARUM (Venice, 1791). 
116 Mizuta, supra note 59, no. 1726. 
117 Edition consulted: JOHANN GOTTLIEB HEINECCIUS, ELEMENTA IURIS CIVILIS SECUNDUM ORDINEM 
INSTITUTIONUM (Vienna, 1763).  Cf. Mizuta, supra note 59, no. 1726 (attributing to Arnold Vinnius, 
and explaining that “[i]dentification is doubtful but there seems to be no work of Heineccius on the 
Institutiones”). 
118 Mizuta, supra note 59, no. 1727. 
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imperialium commentarius academicus et forensis.119  It is an extensive 
commentary on Justinian’s Institutes, following the order of the Institutes. 
These are examples of works that openly follow the order of the ancient works for which 
they provide commentary.  They are indeed civilian works, though not free from the 
influence of natural law.  Vinnius, who taught at the University of Leiden in the middle 
seventeenth century, relies on humanist and even pre-humanist authority, but at the 
same time shows the influence of Grotius.120  Heineccius deserves special mention 
because, though properly classed among writers on natural law, he achieved enormous 
success with a work that served both disciplines.  Schioppa explains how he straddled the 
two worlds.121 
Without doubt the prize for the most prolific author, and particularly the one 
most widely known and read, goes to Johann Gottlieb Heinecke (Heineccius) 
(1681-1741), professor at various German and Dutch universities, whose 
Elementa iuris civilis secundum ordinem Institutionum (1725) claimed no fewer 
than 150 editions in the course of the century.  Equally successful was a parallel 
work that followed instead the systematic order of the Digest, in 50 books.  These 
works owe their enormous success to a concise structure based on short, clear 
definitions of each institute followed by a sequence of well-deduced corollaries, set 
out in axiomatic fashion.  The “pure” principles of Roman private law, with no 
lingering over subtilitates, are thus inserted within a systematic and deductive 
framework far removed from the ancient law, notwithstanding the adoption of the 
traditional scheme of Justinian’s Institutes or Digest.  In this form the text 
becomes a working institutional introduction to the system of “modern” Roman 
private law, anchored directly to the ancient sources, with few references to the 
doctrine of the ius commune but instead precise remarks on contemporary 
judicial practice, in particular where that practice departs from the rules of 
Roman law.  The direct recourse to [Justinian’s] ancient legislation, without 
doctrinal mediation, is particularly significant: the need for simplification has 
now clearly won out. 
The works of Vinnius and Heineccius on the Institutes are not necessarily Smith’s 
models.  They are simply examples of a common literature which appear to have 
influenced Smith’s understanding of the civilian method.  The following table maps the 
order of Smith’s reorganized lectures against the corresponding order of subjects in the 
Institutes.  As above, the Pufendorf/Carmichael/Hutcheson rights framework is shown in 
the first column. 
Rights framework Lectures 1763-1764 (LJB) Justinian’s Institutes 
as a man, 
— in his person 
— in his reputation 
11 — 
as a citizen or a member 
of a state 
11-99 1.2 
                                                                                                                                            
119 The identification is the suggestion of Mizuta.  Editions consulted: ARNOLD VINNIUS, IN QUATUOR 
LIBROS INSTITUTIONUM IMPERIALIUM COMMENTARIUS ACADEMICUS ET FORENSIS (Amsterdam, 1655); 
ARNOLD VINNIUS, IN QUATUOR LIBROS INSTITUTIONUM IMPERIALIUM COMMENTARIUS ACADEMICUS ET 
FORENSIS (Amsterdam, 1665). 
120 R. FEENSTRA & C. J. D. WAAL, SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY LEYDEN LAW PROFESSORS AND THEIR 
INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL LAW 28-30 (1975). 
121 Schioppa, supra note 105, at 349 (E. Metzger, trans.) 
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as a member of a family 101-148 1.3-26 
as a man, 
— in his estate 
149 2.1 - 4.5 
One of the notable changes is the relocation of the rights “as a member of a family.”  This 
now precedes the discussion of rights “as a man in his estate” (property, contract, 
delinquency).  Family rights are the direct counterpart to what civilian works discuss 
under the head of “the law of persons,” and they now rest where the institutional order 
would place them.  Smith, so far as one can see, does not explain why he made this 
change. 
The principal question of course is whether Smith would describe with the word 
“government” the subject matter of the two opening titles122—or more accurately, 
whether he would describe in this way the literature founded on them.  Haakonssen puts 
the bar very high: “At first it is puzzling that Smith should suggest that the “civilians” 
put political jurisprudence, or “government,” first.  Plainly, no writer on the civil law, by 
which Smith meant corpus iuris civilis, began with a discussion of the principles of 
political governance.”123  The Institutes, to be sure, does not begin with “the principles of 
political governance” and nor, for that matter, do Heineccius and Vinnius.  Smith, 
however, did not claim to have found any such civilian work, but simply civilian works 
that “begin with considering government.” 
The Institutes does indeed begin with “government,” though the reader must get 
past the first of the opening titles, which briefly praises justice and contains a handful of 
inspiring words for new law students.124  The second of the opening titles begins with the 
nature of law (the difference between a people’s own law and the ius gentium)125 and then 
gives an account of lawmaking.  It describes the various sources of law; the written 
sources of law are an opportunity to discuss the individual organs of lawmaking: the 
emperor, the magistracies, the jurists, and so on.126  It is, in short, a kind of “potted 
constitutional law.” Aside from a few fast references to the practices of other peoples,127 it 
is not a discussion of “comparative government.”  Nor is it a discussion of “form of 
government,” and even less “the principles of government.”  It is, however, a discussion of 
Roman government.  In short, there is little mystery in Smith’s statement that civilians 
“begin with considering government,” as this would be true of all contemporary literature 
that followed the order of the Institutes. 
Smith’s decision to adopt the method of the civilians was not a sign of admiration 
for Roman law, but a means of escaping a difficulty.  The difficulty was practical rather 
than profound: it was awkward to lecture on the “causes of laws” without having first 
introduced one of the principal causes.  The suitability of the civilian model is a matter of 
accident: no civilian writer, ancient or modern, could anticipate Smith’s ingenious use of 
“forms of government.” 
 
                                                                                                                                            
122 J. INST. 1.1 (De iustitia et iure), 1.2 (De iure naturali et gentium). 
123 HAAKONSSEN, supra note 51, at 130. 
124 J. INST. 1.1.  Thomas says that the title “is devoted to generalities of a banal character.”  THE 
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 3 (J. A. C. Thomas, ed., 1975) 
125 J. INST. 1.2 pr. 
126 J. INST. 1.2.2-12. 
127 J. INST. 1.2.3, 10. 
